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Abstract  
By constructing a behaviour selection model, the paper relies on the method of Net Logo simulation for 
simulation experiments. We study the influence of CPA’s individual characteristics on integrity conduct 
from three aspects of independence, industry specialization and tenure. The results of the study found 
that independence, industry specialization and tenure will have an impact on the integrity conduct. 
Besides, with the improvement of independence, industry specialization and tenure, their integrity 
conduct presents an inverted U type. 
Keywords: CPA; Individual characteristics; Independence; Industry specialization; Tenure. 
 
1. Introduction 
As we know, there are more and more certified public accountants (CPA) and listed corporation provide false 
accounting information together in the securities market. People want to know what happened to these certified 
public accountants [1]. In life, some units under auditing bribe these certified public accountants with lot of benefits 
in order to obtain personal interests and hope that these certified public accountants can cooperate with them. At 
present, audit fees in China are low. The normal income of Certified Public Accountants is far lower than the bribe. 
If certified public accountants help to pad the bill, they can get more benefits than to be honestly. So, some certified 
public accountants choose not to be honest. This kind of behavior not only damaged the image of the certified 
public accountant as “economic police”, but also has an impact on the market economy. Pan Xu-lun had put 
forward the importance of good faith for the accounting personnel in a long time ago [2]. Honesty is responsibility 
for certified public accountants. In 2003, the CPA industry has launched an activity to enhance honesty culture 
construction. The purpose is to foster and develop the integrity of the certified public accountant industry, 
reestablish the integrity image of the entire industry [3]. In June 27, 2014, the State Council issued and implemented 
the "social credit system construction plan (2014 - 2020)". The plan pointed out that the qualification exam, 
professional evaluation, annual appraisal and evaluation of professional titles of accountants, tax accountants, 
lawyers and other occupational population should strengthen the honesty education to help them establish correct 
occupational values. Besides, the plan decides to establish credit archives and exercise a veto with only one vote on 
serious dishonesty behavior [4]. In 2014, 2300 certified public accountants in Guangzhou signed honesty 
convention. They promised to consciously resist the requirements that customers hope them to pad the bill [5]. The 
problem of the integrity of certified public accountants has become the focus of the society. 
Defond and Francis believe that the individual level of accounting firms should be an important factor in the study 
of audit quality [6]. However, at present, the focus of domestic and foreign research is mainly on the firm level and 
neglect the influence of the individual level [7]. For example, Yuan Yuan and Liu Jun studied the impact of the 
audit independence on the quality of accounting information [8]. Liu Wen-Jun, Mi Li and Fu Liang-Xuan 
researched the relationship between audit industry expertise and audit quality [9]. In fact, Signature certified public 
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accountants develop the audit plan, control audit implementation, determine audit opinion and check audit quality. 
Therefore, the individual characteristics of the certified public accountants are very important to the audit quality. 
According to the research of De Angelo, the audit quality is determined by the joint probability of finding and 
reporting irregularities by certified public accountants in the financial statements [10]. The probability of finding 
irregularities mainly depends on the professional skills of the certified public accountants. The problem whether the 
certified public accountants report irregularities means whether they will choose the honesty behavior. So far, the 
research of audit quality is mainly based on the level of audit quality to judge whether the certified public 
accountant is honest. This is more biased in favor of the surface integrity. Fine & Holyfield thought that people's 
trust in a person is not only dependent on the perception of credibility, but also on the identity of the person, the 
rules of the organization, and the reflection of intuition and emotion [11]. Therefore, the surface of the trust does 
not mean that certified public accountants will not pad the bill. Especially for certified public accountants, although 
the professional nature require that they must be honest, but the dependence of certified public accountants to the 
business of the listing Corporation makes it difficult to be completely honest. When the units under auditing require 
them to pad the bill, the certified public accountants will face the choice of individual economic interests and social 
public interests. Therefore, this paper will focus on the study of the effect of the individual characteristics of the 
certified public accountants on the integrity of the certified public accountants when the units under auditing require 
them to pad the bill. In addition, because of the research of this paper is a deliberate deception, it is difficult to get 
real data through interviews. Therefore, this paper will use the analog simulation to test the influence of the 
individual characteristics of the certified public accountant to their integrity conduct. 
2. Individual Characteristics of Certified Public Accountant 
The certified public accountant is a professional who has obtained the certificate of certified public accountant in 
accordance with the law and accepts the practice of the audit, accounting consultancy and accounting services 
business. The staff of the certified public accountants have their own individual characteristics. Therefore, this 
paper made a lot of literature review in May 2014. The paper used titles as "accounting sincerity" to search in 
EBSCO and CNKI and found 3262 articles. Then, we used titles as "the accounting sincerity of the certified public 
accountant" to search and found 75 articles. At last, we added the keyword "effect", leaving only 4 articles. There’s 
few direct research on the factors of the certified public accountants’ integrity conduct. Most of the scholars use the 
audit quality to determine whether the certified public accountants is honest or not. So we used the "audit quality" 
as the keyword to search, collecting 20947 articles. Then, we added the keyword "impact factor", remaining 133 
articles. After that, we compared the articles and summarized the following characteristics (n represents the number 
of articles). 
Independence（n=7） Industry Expertise（n=8） 
Mautz & Sharaf, 1961 
Brink & Witt, 1982 
Abbott, Parker & Park, 2000 
Beasley & Salterio, 2001 
Chen Han-wen & Huang Zong-lan, 2001 
Bédard, J., S. M. Chtourou & L. Courteau, 2004 
Tian Guang-da, 2010 
O.Keefe, T.B., R.D.King & K.M.Gaver, 1994 
Solomon, I., M. D. Shields, & O. R. Whittington, 
1999 
Carcello & Nagy, 2004 
Xia Li-jun, 2004 
Cai Chun & Xian Wen-duo, 2007 
Lim & Tan, 2008 
Liu Gui-liang & Mou Qian, 2008 
Mi Li & Fu Liang-xuan, 2010 
Tenure（n=8） Gender（n=4） 
De Angelo, 1981 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1983 
Myers & Omer, 2003 
Yu Yu-miao & Li Lin, 2006 
Chen Xin-yuan & Xia Li-jun, 2006 
Liu Qi-liang, 2006 
Dan Dhaliwal & Vic Naiker&Farshid Navissi, 2010 
Zhou Wei, Xu Yu-de & Wang Ning，2012 
Ding Li, Li Ming-hui & Lv Wei, 2012 
Liu Xiao-chun, 2014 
Luo Chun-hua, Tang Jian-xin & Wang Yu-sheng, 
2014 
Wang Liang-chen, Dong Lin, Yang Da-li & Sun Fei, 
2014 
Position（n=1） Other Qualifications (n=1) 
Luo Chun-hua, Tang Jian-xin & Wang Yu-sheng, 2014 Liu Xiao-chun, 2014 
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2.1 Independence 
Independence is the foundation of audit profession. The nature of the certified public accountants decides that they 
should have a high independence. They can audit and publish audit opinion with objective, fair and realistic attitude 
[12]. However, the economic dependence and independence of certified public accountants is opposite. The 
economic interests tend of certified public accountants will weak his independence and influence his professional 
judgment. On the contrary, the certified public accountants with Independence will have little economic agent to 
collude with the senior management so that they can monitor the performance of the manager objectively and fairly. 
Therefore, the improvement of the independence of the certified public accountants will make them choose integrity 
conduct. Previous studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between the independence and the quality 
of the financial statements [13-16]. However, it should be pointed out that the independence is a dynamic process, 
not a static one. Brink & Witt have suggested that independence is a relative concept, sometimes strong and 
sometimes weak [17]. To a certain extent, the auditor's independence depends on the game between the auditor and 
the audit client. The equilibrium points of the two sides determine the independence [18]. 
2.2 Industry Expertise 
Auditor industry specialization is an important factor that affects the audit quality, which is the knowledge and 
expertise owned by the auditor [19]. Scholars at home and abroad have different opinions on whether the impact of 
industry expertise is positive or negative. O.Keefe et al. believes that the audit staff with industry expertise have 
lower possibility to violate the GAAP's reporting guidelines [20]. Because the audit staff with industry expertise 
have more professional knowledge so as to make accurate audit judgment [21]. Carcello & Nagy also proposed that 
the audit staff's industry expertise and the frequency of financial fraud have negative correlation [22]. In addition, 
Lim & Tan found that auditors’ industry expertise makes it more likely to issue continuous business non - standard 
opinions and reduce the possibility of financial restatement [23]. In the domestic research, Cai Chun & Xian Wen-
duo found that the accounting firm industry expertise and audit quality have negative correlation through the 
analysis of the audit market of China listing Corporation [24]. Liu Gui-liang & Mou Qian’s research also shows that 
the auditor’s industry expertise does not have a role in improving audit quality [25]. While Liu Wen-Jun, Mi Li & 
Fu Liang-xuan found that the auditor's industry expertise can improve audit quality through the analysis of the 
companies’ empirical evidence of financial fraud. They also found that the cause of the differences is in the 
selection of measures of the auditor's industry expertise [9]. This study considers the certified public accountants’ 
industry expertise can make them choose integrity conduct to some extent. Because if certified public accountants 
have industry expertise, the knowledge and expertise in a particular industry can make them know the customer's 
business situation better and more likely to find out the potential Vital mistakes in financial report compared to 
those with no industry expertise and ultimately choose integrity conduct. 
2.3 Tenure 
The “Sarbanes - Oxley ” bill requires that the companies should implement audit partner rotation system what lead 
to a dispute about whether audit tenure will have a positive impact on audit quality. At present, there are two views 
on the relationship between tenure and audit quality. One view is that there’s a negative correlation between audit 
tenure and audit quality. Bhagat & Black [27] Vafeas [28] found that if the certified public accountants’ tenure is 
short, they will be less affected by the client company and will have more positive impact on the audit quality. Liu 
Qi-liang found that audit tenure and audit quality is negatively related through the study of listing corporation from 
1998 to 2004 [29]. Zhou Wei et al. found that when the accounting firm has little money, the extension of the term 
of the certified public accountants will lead to a significant reduction in the robustness of the accounting report, 
while when the accounting firm has much money, the relationship between tenure and the stability of the 
accounting earnings is not clear [30]. The extension of audit tenure has a negative impact on audit quality since the 
longer the auditor's tenure is, the more likely they will have "economic dependence" on the client company. If the 
certified public accountants choose not to connive with the audited units, then they are likely to be faced with the 
danger of being fired. This will cut off their source of the economy which leads them to choose to pad the bill [31-
32]. Another view is that long tenure will not affect audit quality. In the report by Price Waterhouse Coopers in 
2002, when the certified public accountants’ tenure is short, they cannot know the client’s information well, then 
the audit may fail. Myers & Omer found that audit quality and audit tenure is positively related through the study of 
the listing corporation in America from 1998 to 2000 [33]. The reason of this phenomenon is that when the auditor's 
tenure is long, the number of audit is also increased, so that the audit staff can know the characteristics of the 
production and operation, the transaction process, operating system and internal control system of the company 
well. Hence, the audit quality can be improved [34]. In addition, Chen Xin-yuan & Xia Li-jun came to a different 
view of the previous scholars. They thought that the audit tenure and audit quality are inverted U type relationship. 
When the audit tenure is less than a certain year (about 6 years), the increase of audit tenure has a positive effect on 
audit quality. While when the audit tenure is over a certain year (about 6 years), the increase of audit tenure has a 
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negative effect on audit quality. However, scholars generally believe that longer audit tenure will damage the 
auditor's independence, but it can improve the professional skills of audit staff [35]. 
2.4 Principle of the Certified Public Accountants' Behavior Choice 
2.4.1 Expected Revenue 
People are rational economic man, and the certified public accountants are no exception. Adams Smith have pointed 
out that "self-interest" is the nature of "economic person" in The Wealth of Nations [36]. At the same time, the 
behavior of the certified public accountant is regulated by the government, the association of certified public 
accountants and other departments. When a certified public accountant is found to pad the bill, he will be punished. 
Thus, the expected revenue of Certified Public Accountants is expressed as follows: 
When the certified public accountant is honest, the revenue is: 
U=R                                                                                         (1) 
When the certified public accountant is not honest, the expected revenue is: 
1 2(1 )*( ) *( )n cU q R R q Rc R C C                                   (2) 
In addition, 
*cR R  
Symbol Description: 
R：The income obtained by the certified public accountant under normal circumstances, including the wages, 
benefits, etc. 
Rc：Abnormal returns obtained by certified public accountant when he is dishonest. 
C1：The government departments fine the certified public accountant when he is dishonest. 
C2：When the certified public accountant’ dishonest behavior is found, he should pay social costs, including 
demotion, dismissal, moral pressure, social public opinion pressure etc. 
Ε ：When the certified public accountant pads the bill, his income can increase ε times. 
Q ：The ratio of spot check conducted by the supervision department. 
2.4.2  Behavior Probability Model 
Since this study research on the probability of the certified public accountant choosing the dishonest behavior under 
the generally expected return when dishonest. In the behavior probability model, the input is the expected return of 
the behavior, and the output is the probability of choosing the related behavior. In the paper, the certified public 
accountant 's behavior is simplified into honest behavior and dishonest behavior, that is a  and a . The behavior 
probability model is constructed as follows: 
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In this model, βij is the regression coefficient, and the value range is βi0∈ (-∞,∞); When i [1,2,…,N]；When 
i[1,2,…,N]，j[1,2,…,6],  βij >0。 
3. Model Initialization 
3.1 Setting of Environment Parameter 
Table 1: Setting of Environment Parameter 
Model Parameter Parameter Values 
Range of Analog interface 20×20 
Total number of subjects 100 
Number of Certified Public Accountants in good faith 90 
Number of Certified Public Accountants in bad faith 10 
Color of Certified Public Accountants in good faith White 
Color of Certified Public Accountants in bad faith Black 
3.2 Expected Revenue of Certified Public Accountants 
Table 2: Setting of Expected Revenue Parameter 
R Rc C1 C2 ε q 
[8,10] ε*R 6 4*R 6-β1 0.40 
3.3 Subject Characteristics of Certified Public Accountants 
The degree of independence of certified public accountants is expressed byβi1 and the range is [0, 6]. Among them, 
0 said that the certified public accountant does not have independence, while the 6 is the strongest. Similarly, the 
certified public accountants’ industry expertise and tenure is expressed by βi2 andβi3 and the range is [0, 6]. βi1, 
βi2 andβi3 are the coefficient of the expected revenue of the certified public accountant when they are honest. βi4, 
βi5 andβi6 are the coefficient of the expected revenue of the certified public accountant when they are dishonest. At 
the same time, they meet the following relationship: 
1 4
2 5
3 6
6
6
6
i i
i i
i i
 
 
 
 

 
  
 
The initial parameters are set as follows： 
Table 3: Initial Parameter Settings 
0i  1i

 2i

 3i

 
2 2 3 2 
4. Analysis of the Simulation Results 
After initialization, the system begins to run. In this study, the effects of independence, industry expertise and 
tenure on the integrity conduct of certified public accountants are simulated. 
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4.1. Analysis of the Simulation Results of the Independence and Integrity Conduct of Certified Public 
Accountants 
Through the experiment, we found that when the value of βi1 is 2, 3, 4, 6, the comparison between these graphs is 
more obvious. The dark lines in the picture indicate the number of certified public accountants who choose honest 
behavior, and the light colored lines are the number of certified public accountants in the choice of dishonest 
behavior. Independence is considered to be the soul of audit, is the premise of ensuring the integrity of the certified 
public accountants. Defond Wong & Shuhua Li considered that as long as there is potential factors can lead to the 
loss of independence, we should say the audit quality cannot be guaranteed and the audit opinion should be 
considered to be questionable. From figure 1a-c, we can see that with the increase of the independence, more and 
more certified public accountants choose integrity conduct. This also confirms the influence of independence on the 
certified public accountants. However, with the degree of independence becoming higher, we find that the number 
of the certified public accountants who choose integrity conduct come to decrease from figure 1a-d. We believe that 
this phenomenon is due to the certified public accountants are also economic persons. At the same time, the 
economic man is rational person who wants to maximization their own interests. When the degree of independence 
is higher and higher, due to the unique nature of the certified public accountants, their job content is transparent to 
the company's shareholders or other certified public accountants. At this time, when the auditing company requires 
the certified public accountant to cooperate with them, the certified public accountants may choose dishonest 
behavior out of the great interests. 
 
Figure 1: The Simulation Results of the Effect of Changing the Degree of Independence on the Behavior 
Choice 
 
 
 
(a) βi1=2                                                                  (b)βi1=3 
 
(c)βi1=4                                                (d)βi1=6 
 
4.2. Analysis of the Simulation Results of the Industry Expertise and Integrity Conduct of Certified 
Public Accountants 
Certified public accountants with industry expertise can improve their professional competence and know the 
business mode of specific industries and the source of the risk of errors in-depth which is more conducive to 
develop knowledge and audit methods of specific industry [37]. As a result, we think that certified public 
accountants with industry expertise can be more in-depth understanding and make accurate judgment of the 
financial statements of the Auditing Company. Besides, these advantages also make the quality of audit reports to 
be improved. However, domestic and foreign scholars have different research results. Foreign scholars generally 
believe that the industry expertise can be a good way to improve the certified public accountants’ audit ability and 
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audit quality, while domestic scholars' research results are very different. Most domestic scholars believe that the 
certified public accountants’ industry expertise and audit quality is not relevant or even negative. From figure 2a-c, 
we can see that in a certain range, with the improvement of the certified public accountants’ industry expertise, the 
probability of choosing honest behavior is also improved. But in figure 2c, the improvement of the degree of 
industry expertise has reduced the integrity conduct of the certified public accountants. We believe that the reason 
for this is that the improvement of industry expertise is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the improvement of 
the industry expertise can improve the quality of the audit report. On the other hand, with the improvement of 
industry expertise, the certified public accountants is getting better and better understanding of this industry, and 
clearly know where are the loopholes what makes it easier to publish false audit information.  
 
Figure 2: The Simulation Results of the Effect Of Changing the Degree Of Industry Expertise on the 
Behavior Choice 
 
 
 
(a) βi2=2                                             (b) βi2=4                                             (c) βi2=5 
4.3. Analysis of the Simulation Results of the Tenure and Integrity Conduct of Certified Public 
Accountants 
Zhou Dong-Hua et al. found that investors reject the listing companies with long tenure and standard audit opinion 
[26]. From figure 4a-d we can see that when the certified public accountants’ tenure becomes longer and longer, the 
number of integrity behavior of the certified public accountants is accompanied by a rise, but to a certain period of 
time, it come to decline. This study argues that this is because at the beginning of, certified public accountants do 
not understand clients’ situation, so padding the bill is not controllable. With the extension of the certified public 
accountants’ tenure and the increasing number of audits, certified public accountants get more understanding of 
clients so that they can take effective audit procedures to help clients pad the bill. At the same time, with the 
increase of tenure, the emotional connection between the certified public accountants and clients continues to 
deepen. On the one hand, this will reduce their professional attitude. On the other hand, this will increase their 
dependence on the clients, so as to cause the CPA and the client's “collusion”. This is consistent with the results of 
Chen Xin-Yuan and Xia Li-Jun's research. That is, audit tenure and audit quality are inverted U type relationship. 
We believe that this is consistent with the generally accepted view that long tenure audit tenure will impair the 
independence of certified public accountants, but can improve their professional skills. 
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Figure 3:  The Simulation Results of the Effect Of Changing the Degree of Tenure on the BehaviorChoice 
 
 
(a) βi3=2                                                                 (b) βi3=3 
 
(c) βi3=4                                                                       (d) βi3=5 
  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
i) Independence and the integrity conduct of certified public accountants show a U - shaped relationship. The 
improvement of the degree of independence will promote the certified public accountants to choose honest 
behavior to some extent. However, when the degree of independence comes to a certain extent, the number 
of certified public accountants who choose honest behavior begins to decline. The certified public 
accountants with independence must truly have no benefit relationship with the clients and their attitude 
must be impartial in the auditing process. Besides, their professional judgment and audit opinion cannot 
dependent and succumbed to pressure from outside. Therefore, the higher the independence of the certified 
public accountants have, the more difficult to be dishonest in a certain degree. However, when the 
independence of certified public accountants comes to a certain extent, the certified public accountants will 
reduce their own requirements out of the pursuit of their own interests. As a result, they will choose the 
dishonest behavior. Here, we believe that there may be differences in the form of independence and 
substantive independence. The subsequent high degree of independence may be just a form of 
independence, so that the integrity conduct of certified public accountants begins to decline. So, when we 
research on the independence of certified public accountants, we should pay attention to distinguish the 
form of independence and substantive independence. 
ii) When the certified public accountants master the characteristics, business processes, accounting policies 
and other knowledge of the industry, they can improve their professional judgment and audit efficiency, so 
as to assess the fairness of the financial report more accurately and improve the audit quality. When the 
CPA's industry expertise comes to improve, the number of certified public accountants who choose honest 
behavior is also increasing. However, it can be seen that the industry expertise is not always improve the 
integrity conduct of the certified public accountants from the experimental results which is in line with the 
fact. When certified public accountants’ industry expertise achieves a certain degree, their understanding 
of the industry gradually deepen. The certified public accountants believe that they have enough 
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confidence and ability to pad the bill and conceal their false audit information so as to increase the 
dishonest behavior. 
iii) At present, it is generally believed that long tenure can improve the professional skills of the certified 
public accountants, but will damage the independence. China began to implement the regular rotation 
system of signature accountant in 2004. At the beginning of the engagement, the certified public 
accountants rarely take the initiative to pad the bill because of the uncontrollability and great risks. After 
several years, the certified public accountants are familiar with economic activities and business process of 
the audited companies. They will choose dishonest behavior to help those audited companies. In addition, 
with the tenure becoming long, the link between the certified public accountants and the clients continues 
to deepen so that some certified public accountants allow the clients the requirements to issue false audit 
information. What’s more, some certified public accountants help the clients cover up its false financial 
statements voluntarily. From the results of this paper, we can see that the tenure and certified public 
accountants' honest behavior is also a kind of inverted U type. 
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